(I know nothing politically/historically about this that was not available in the NY Times--I am an English student. On the other hand, this means I know how to read and dissect arguments fairly well. And that I am less ideologically fixed regarding these issues than a specialist would be.)
I think it would be very interesting to ask a proponent of the Iraq war & occupation a series of questions in which one would "play dumb" and prod each answer that is presented as self-evident with an "and then...?" or "so...?", because everyone must feel that the occupation and ongoing war is being waged on rather shaky principles. So, when someone defends the occupation by saying that "If we left, the region would fall into even further chaos," not only would there need to be an argument about the probability of that event, but (naively) what would be so bad about that?
To demonstrate that we need a single troop in Iraq, to my satisfaction, some combination of the following would have to be shown:
-- that it is morally justifiable to invade and devastate a sovereign country, and then continue to occupy it, as long as you feel bad about the initial invasion. (This, of course, is the premise of a number of film noirs, where someone keeps doing bad things to save their hide, even though they already regret the initial crime. They usually end up badly.)
-- that our military presence in Iraq is or could be anything but a standing insult and open wound to the people of that country
-- that our diplomatic pressure in Iraq can lead to anything but a kind of Vichy collaboration with the occupation (us)
-- that our continuing military presence is reducing the influence of Al Qaeda in Iraq
-- that our continuing military presence is a stabilizing influence in Iraq (this seems to be the main argument--if we leave, everything will fall apart--but, stated in this positive way, it is completely absurd. THE destabilizing force in the region is our military presence. To me this is very obvious), rather than a festering sore.
-- that even a horrible regime arising after our departure would be so much worse than the near-civil-war and bloodshed consuming Iraq now.
-- that there would be a kind of "domino effect" where, if Iraq "fell" (I don't see how this wouldn't already be the case, by the way), then other countries would follow.
-- that the United States is justified in militarily occupying other countries on the basis of a paranoid fantasy that our national security is at stake.
-- that this paranoid fantasy is the real motive, instead of the obviously economic and racist motives.
-- that Arab peoples are barbarians who can't rule themselves without white people around, and who will come to the "wrong" conclusions unless we are there to shepherd them in the right direction.
-- that Iraq ought to become a Jeffersonian democracy
-- that our interests in the region are not wildly inappropriate and imperialist
-- that Iraq ought to remain a single nation
-- that an Iran under the influence of Iran and Syria, et al, would be so awful.
-- that, what people would condemn as "isolationism" in a withdrawal, would not be a noble demonstration of our commitment to anti-aggression and self-determination.
-- that self-determination for Iraq can be achieved with our military there
-- that this ought to remain any of our business; that we haven't "done enough" yet
-- that things will at all improve in the next 3 years than in the past 3, if we "stay the course"
To me, these are the claims of anyone who thinks there should be a SINGLE American/British soldier in Iraq. I find them all highly doubtful and henceforth, I have no moral tolerance for anyone who would advocate our continued presence in Iraq on these grounds--if there are other arguments, I would like to hear them; if I have been mistaken about the validity of these, I would like to see evidence. Otherwise, any argument for "gradual" or delayed withdrawal, much less a "troop surge" or even "staying the course" will simply be posturing in the service of an oppressive and unjustifiable military occupation. Troops out now!--it's not just a sentiment.
As I see it, there would be two (moral and legal) justifications for an American military presence in Iraq, neither of which have been discussed (to my knowledge):
-- the invitation of the Iraqi people for our intervention
-- the approval of the UN (which has repeatedly stressed the opposite--that intervention in Iraq should be regional and multilateral)
And, as far as the probability of either of those events, I won't be holding my breath.
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7 comments:
I think if you were to ask the average citizen about the situation, without reflecting on exactly what the meaning behind their belief is, they would assert your list item that Iraqis are incapable of self governence without US intervention. I think this would be so much the stronger point now (given the way the media/politicians currently spins things), that antiterrorist- antiglobal-wmd-threat issues would be a well delayed afterthought. though I think if given the prompting to stop and think about it, the average citizen would come to the conclusion that the belief is abhorently racist and dismiss it.
you should add to your list the question of how a US aided regime would differ both politically and in just general spin-feel from previous instances of US "puppet" governments in any region of the world; and what would make this one more successful---more likely to take---than those.
whenever questions of activities in Iraq come up, I think about a part of Pindar's odes (I wish I could site where exactly it comes from, but I've learned of it indirectly through M. Leyner's pindarian analysis of professional women's beach volleyball) where he defines heroic as 'more dangerous for the actor than a spectator or bystander.'
hi Ben,
I'll bite. some items on your 'list of demands' are more or less on point, some are kind of meaningless, and some demonstrate serious misunderstandings of the political/historical context. I'll focus on a couple instances of the latter that jumped out at me:
- 'that our continuing military presence is a stabilizing influence in Iraq.' the main event in Iraq right now is not nationalistic Iraqis vs. US, it's Shia vs. Sunni. it's definitely possible that we won't be able to prevent a full-scale civil war/ethnic cleansing scenario even if we try, but if we leave it is much, much more likely to happen.
- 'THE destabilizing force in the region is our military presence'. even as an English major reading only the NYT, I assume you've at least tangentially read about the numerous sources of instability in the region that have nothing to do with our military presence: Sunni vs. Shia (which predates the existence of America by several centuries), Persia/Iran vs. the Arabs, monarchies and autocracies vs. radical Islamic movements, modernity vs. tribal culture, lack of economic opportunity vs. a huge youth bulge - to name just five sources of serious long-term instability that have wracked the Middle East for the past few years/decades/centuries, none of which will magically disappear if the US leaves. in fact, I'd guess that most would actually get worse, as hard as that might be to imagine
- 'that even a horrible regime arising after our departure would be so much worse than the near-civil-war and bloodshed consuming Iraq now.' you conveniently omit the civil war that would probably come in between today's 'near-civil war' and tomorrow's 'horrible regime'. from what I understand, there is a pretty dramatic difference between 'near' civil war and actual civil fucking war. you're naive if you think that things can't get much, much worse for the Iraqis.
imagine a not-at-all far-fetched scenario in which, after a US departure, the unrestrained Shia government decides to bring security to Baghdad by 'cleansing' it of its Sunni population. how would it feel to be directly responsible for ushering in the first chapter of 'a problem from hell 2'? if our hypothetical policymaker can tell himself 'well it was REALLY Bush's fault for invading in the first place', will he not be haunted by the mass graves dug in the wake of his own choice?
- 'that things will at all improve in the next 3 years than in the past 3, if we "stay the course"' just as a matter of the historical record, I believe that the average length of successful counterinsurgency campaigns is like 7 years or so.
Well, it is true that there are long-standing "sources of long-term instability," but it is not true that these were on the same scale in Iraq five years ago as they are now. I agree, "Let's historicize," but that also means the recent past, Saddam's regime, is not to be ignored.
By which I OF COURSE DON'T MEAN that we should "learn lessons from his style of rule," but rather we should learn that these "historical" and "long-standing" sources of instability were dormant under a certain kind of regime which certainly had less day-to-day violence than the period including and following the US invasion. That is, if these are long-standing, they are ALSO relatively recent in their non-latent, Iraqi versions.
I see that things can get worse for the Iraqis in both situations... I am not sure that if we achieve all of the USA's goals in Iraq, and leave with a mission-accomplished, that everything (at that point in some future time) won't go to shit the next day, though.
yes, 'lessons learned', etc, but what about 'troops out now!'?
Bush obviously has no incentive to bring the troops home b/c that would equal defeat, and (some) history might plausibly blame at least some of any eventual failure on his successor. but the next president, regardless of their party, will still face the shitteous dilemma outlined above, where the high likelihood of *serious* civil war in the aftermath of a US withdrawal (attempted under the 'fragile' conditions prevailing today, at least) is such a potentially gruesome risk that 'we' continue to cling to the slimmest hope that things will eventually improve - even under conditions of this 'near' civil war.
again, as bad as Iraq is and as bad as the repercussions have been for the US, there's a lot of darkness to go through before we bottom out, and no president will want to preside over the abyss - *even if we would ultimately be better off to self-inflict the wound now rather than later*
well, I would like to know what the future-state-of-peace would look like, and ask what the US course of action would be if this future state was peaceful but politically unacceptable to us.
For example, if Iraq settled down and the everyday terrorism stopped, and the government functioned, but they were aligned with Iran---well, that would be one definition of "success" but certainly not one acceptable to the United States.
- and - even in this dark hour, the power of the still-dominant (if declining?) view in the West that all men are created equal etc, in classical liberal ideas of the free willed, 'rational' self, etc, will make it very hard to give up hope that things might somehow get better through the workings of the Iraqis' own, ostensibly peaceful, democratic desires, so long as we can just keep the walls from caving in completely... while our crypto-theological beliefs in the power of freedom etc certainly weren't the only rationale for going to war, it was one of the most important ones for the 'respectable' foreign policy establishment, and it will almost certainly be the one that ultimately keeps us there longest, most other rationales having failed
the question of what exactly an acceptable end-state would be is obviously relevant, and any answer is virtually guaranteed to be meaningless. some wise expert could sketch out a sophisticated-seeming checklist and a roadmap to get there, but by the time the press release is finished I'm sure the facts on the ground will have changed unpredictably, rendering most of its prescriptions irrelevant. this is an extreme fog of war we're dealing with, and it'd be unrealistic to even say 'we'll know it when we see it'. I think it's more like, we'll know what it's NOT it when we see it - the acceptable end state will be some kind of situation in which Iraq isn't on the verge of full on sectarian armageddon and the political climate in the US is favorable. any conditions beyond that is sheer speculation
and it is almost certain that any lasting Shi'ite Iraqi government will have at least cordial relations with Iran, for both ideological and strategic reasons - not only are they co-religionists, but thanks to the events of the past 3 years Iran is now clearly the rising power in the region, and will be able to (continue to) cause no end of trouble in Iraq if they so choose. not that there aren't nationalistic forces and a hugely significant doctrinal split within the Shia that will keep the relationship tense... but generally, I think that hopes of transforming Iraq into the kind of reliable regional proxy that we've been lacking ever since Iran quit the job are pretty widely recognized as unachievable at this point
I think that most realistic heads in the military and foreign policy establishment (see the Baker-Hamilton report) realize and accept this inevitability in Iran-Iraq relations. even if the president is ultimately too wedded to his hardline stance against Iran, the next president will almost certainly come around to the existing consensus.
this is one of the possible 'silver linings' of the invasion - contrary to the wishes of its most hawkish backers, who wanted to use Iraq as a base to launch a similar invasion of Iran, Iraq may eventually serve to facilitate detente between the US and Iran.
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